Is there a struggle for paradise and for power? – (What future for the Transatlantic Alliance?)
Abstract
What future for the Transatlantic Alliance? At a time of civilizational chance, will it still be useful? Should the world be viewed geopolitically or geoeconomically? Which problems arise from the promotion of democracy among civilizations? Should “liberty” be imposed? Will there be consequences for society due to the resistance to change shown by the political power?
These considerations try to comment these and other questions at a time when the economical overcomes the political power, when the State no longer provides the ends for which it was created and when the rights and liberties of the citizens are put aside in favor of security. Particularly, it tries to glimpse, the usefulness of the Transatlantic Alliance in today’s world and in the future.
General Considerations
It is true that on the perspective of military power, the positions between Europeans and North Americans are divergent, particularly in what concerns “… the establishment of national priorities, the identification of threats, the definition of challenges and the conception and implementation of external and defense politics”[1]. Why? First, the doctrinal supports of international politics are different. Although both were influenced by Machiavelli, Hobbes, Kant and Clausewitz, the main doctrinal influence for the Europeans is Raymond Aron whereas for the North Americans is Hans Morgenthau (despite his own belief of failing to influence U.S. foreign policy). Thus, whilst Aron believed in the international institutions and on prudence as a form to assure international peace, Morgenthau called this type of ideas as naive and didn’t believe in idealistic reforms for the international system. Second, the North Americans were those who, in accordance with Morgenthau teachings, truly put in practice the Clausewitz principle that “the war is a mere continuation of politics, by other means”[2], i.e., that it is a political instrument and as such must be used when necessary. If it is, as Morgenthau said, the aspiration for power on the part of several nations that allows the balance of power, then, transposing this assumption to the relation between North Americans and Europeans, as the latter, in relation to the military power aren’t ambitious, the balance of power doesn’t work. And much less will work in a unipolar world. Third, it is useful to remember that many of the threats that, nowadays, rage in the world are, directly or indirectly, a creation of the North Americans. Weren’t, among others, Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden supported by U.S. when such was suitable to them? And when this began to be inconvenient to them, what did the U.S. do?
The European lack of military capacity isn’t the only reason for the divergences between the U.S.A. and Europe in what respects “the strategic targets (…) in the war against terrorism”[3]. The identification of these targets is also one of them. The Europeans have had different reactions with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the reasons that had supported the intervention in the former were accepted, the same didn’t succeed with the latter, because the accusations made by the Bush Administration – and by Tony Blair – were false. Today we know that there were no weapons of massive destruction in Iraq neither the links between Saddam Hussein and the Al Qaeda were proven. The North Americans can be sure that the Europeans will support them, in future initiatives, if the presented proof are bona fide and if the identified targets are real and not the strategically one’s chosen by the North Americans.
It is also true that “two centuries later, the Americans and the Europeans have switched place (…)”[4] and that their roles were inverted, being the Americans the military power of the world while Europe is only an economic power. But does this mean to say U.S. aren’t, or don’t want to be, an economic power any longer? And that only recently have the United States become a military power? Of course, it doesn’t. In their first years, North Americans preached the commercial creed because, although already a strong nation, they didn’t have alternative at that time due to their internal division: The States of the North and the States of the South. Only after the Civil War (1861-65)[5] did the U.S., now united and focused in the same objectives, acted as a true nation and delineated an authentic national strategy. Thus, putting in practice the teachings of, among others, Alfred T. Mahan[6], the U.S. initiated a policy of overseas expansion – in the Caribbean Islands and in the Pacific – aiming at two objectives: commercial power and military power. It doesn’t matter which of the two was achieved first because between both there is a relation of cause-effect, and as such the United States knew that, sooner or later, they would be a commercial power as well as a military power. The best illustration of this affirmation is Paul Kennedy’s words, because both aim the same objective as “(…) wealth is usually necessary to support the military power and the military power is usually necessary to acquire and to protect wealth”[7]. So, it isn’t strange that John Quincy Adams affirmations, pronounced in 1821, as the then Secretary of State, saying that America “(…) She goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy (…) She might become the dictatress of the world. She would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit”[8], were, in my opinion, completely forgotten by 1897. It is precisely during the presidencies of William McKinley (1897-1901) and Theodore Roosevelt (1901-09) that the U.S. foreign policies received strong impulses. As Mahan worried that the U.S. Constitution’s restrains pose an obstacle to expansion, he argued that those limitations on the executive power be ignored. Thus, within the organic structure of the North American political organization, we can say that the legislative branch is less imperialist than the executive one. Regardless, the United States is an imperialist nation. Not in the classic sense of colonialism and timidly in the beginning of their history as a nation, but nevertheless they are an imperialist country. They always have been. And after the World War II this propensity increased, and more obviously since the end of the Cold-War.
As for the Europeans, there are no doubts that “when the great European powers were strong, they believed in force and in warlike glory”[9], and it is undeniable that the use of military force was an essential tool in the conquest and formation of the European empires. But this occurred during periods of history when the sovereign States did not occupy the totality of the continents and, as such, territorial expansion was legal and the colonies were a reality without infractions to the international law. The same happened to the U.S. nation’s expansion. And its growth beyond the borders of the original thirteen states across the continent didn’t also represent an infraction to international law. Neither a contradiction can be found in John Quincy Adams backing of the Monroe Doctrine as continental expansion isn’t the same as going abroad.
There are, in my opinion, two events that made the use of force no longer a priority for the Europeans: First, the advent of the nationalistic movements that curiously started in the Europe, in 1740[10], and go on until the independent movements of the twentieth century colonies. Because of them, the world would never be the same and, consequently, neither would Europe. “The Vienna’s Congress did not reconstruct the Europe previous to 1789“[11]. Nor anything else made it because Nations started to populate the world. Particularly significant of these is the period subsequent to the Second World War. The decolonization was, at this time, a bubbling phenomenon. And, still today, new Nations appear[12]; second, the two world wars which dilacerated Europe provoking the loss of its primacy in the world stage. The necessity to reconstruct a devastated Europe disabled the possibility of sending “(…) sufficient means to overseas to keep the colonial empires in Asia, Africa and Middle-East”[13] and accentuated its dependence on the North American capitals.
This dependence allied to the mechanisms of security and respect for the international law that the winners of the Second Great War created, made territorial expansion more difficult. Then, after losing their own colonies, how could they expand and increase their influence? It was through commerce that they were able to do so. Through it internal territories of other nations “are invaded” without infractions to the international law. This is one of the reasons why Europeans opted for economic power. The others are: the Transatlantic Alliance and the protection that the U.S. had provided and the traumas of the two great wars. Europe was the region of the world that suffered most with them. The experience of 9/11 was traumatic for the United States but there is no possible comparison with one, much less two, world wars.
It is equally true that the Americans are children of the Enlightenment and that they were their most devoted apostles. But they aren’t anymore and, today, Enlightenment ideals blossom in the European construction, while the ideas of freedom and equality – consecrated by the U.S. Constitution – sunk due to the constant use of force and run over of international law made by North Americans. Democracy is the best of all political systems, but such statute doesn’t give it the legitimacy to be imposed. One thing is one’s readiness to fight for it and another thing, completely different, is to impose democracy to others.
Robert Kagan said that “such as the Americans had always believed to have discovered the secret of the human happiness and had desired to export it to the rest of the world, also the Europeans saw the dawn of a new mission in its own discovery of the perpetual peace”[14]. This isn’t true because Europeans don’t want to export anything. They only expect to serve as example. The lessons learned with the exportation of the ideals of the French revolution, which lead to the Napoleonic wars, weren’t forgotten. Therefore, because it’s only an example and not a product, the new European idealism doesn’t need anybody’s approval apart from their own. Thus, the answer to the question on the possibility of Europe return to its past in the case of failure of the international law is negative. The only thing that can provoke such scenery is the collapse of the transatlantic link. But that will be the downfall of the entire Occidental civilization.
Ironically, because Europeans owe their present accomplishments and possibilities to the U. S., the success of the European integration don’t please certain North American sectors, particularly, the creation of a European army because they would prefer Europe to remain dependent of the United States. This position has suffered a vague change since 2003’s Operation Iraqi Freedom, which created two war fronts and pushed to the limits the North American armed forces. As such, at the 2004 and 2006 NATO summits, U.S. officials strongly urged the European allies to increase its materials contributions to the Alliance operations, mainly those concerning the war in Afghanistan and in order to be able to carry out this requests both the EU and its member states must develop their military capacities. And regarding international treaties, the North Americans never had any kind of problems in always dodging them each time they are seen as a thorn in the foot, i.e., when it is in the cause of a national strategic interest and an international treaty, the U.S. always choose for the former at the prejudice of the latter. That is why the United States doesn’t accept the applicability of any international judicial instance. They know they violate the international law. Accordingly, the U.S. has never restrained them from intervening, directly or indirectly, in the domestic affairs of all and any another State. And this is what makes them a target!
When the Clinton Administration took the first steps in the construction of a new system of defense against antiballistic missiles it wasn’t only the possibility to be vulnerable to a nuclear attack that worried the Europeans. More than this, as Aron words[15] were remembered, they were uneasy by the possibility of a nuclear attack becoming more real, because such defense system would destroy the capacity of retaliation to a nuclear attack, revoking the Deterrence theory. Therefore, for many, is false the argument that U.S. invokes of protection against an attack on the part of the state-pariah or the “axle of evil”. The United States predisposition to the use of its military might[16] wasn’t only caused by the removal of the Soviet threat. That is one of the causes. The necessity to test their investments in armament in a real war scene is a greater or a bigger priority. So, North Americans try to be as decisive as possible when they use their military force because such allows them to test their weapons, observe effects and performance for making eventual adaptations and corrections, and also allow them to aim at the businesses that the postwar reconstruction period will bring to U.S. companies. Wasn’t Halliburton the winner of the Iraq war? Thus, when leading the military process, United States knows that they will lead the diplomatic and economic processes.
Different perspectives of the same world
Ever since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. never learnt how to deal with the way their overseas interventions are seen by other people, even when well intentioned, which is, at the very least, very odd for the marketing country by excellence. The only explanation is that the United States stopped caring about this. During the Cold War, some North American thinkers alerted for the danger that the U.S. behavior could pervert the ideals of freedom and democracy United States said to uphold, both internal and externally[17]. There were also warnings against the effects of the increased influence on the part of the military-industrial lobby in the heart of the U.S. government, as e.g. Dwight D. Eisenhower Farewell Address – “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex” – but all these acknowledgments have been forgotten, and the situation got worse since the end of the Cold War, when, in a unipolar system, U.S. lost perception of their role[18]. That is why the United States prefers the anarchical hobbesian world because it is there that they find the reason for the use of its military power. But as we live in a unipolar world – a world that U.S. had helped to create – the other countries don’t understand the United States reason to the use of its military power. If there isn’t any longer a communist threat, why is the use of force continued?
All the principles enumerated in the United Nations (UN) Charter, as well as those from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are valid, but there isn’t anything, either in the UN or in NATO, saying that democracy must be imposed on others. One thing is to defend democracy and another, completely different, is to force it on others. In the months that preceded the war in Iraq, the Bush Administration re-launched the debate on the importance of democracy in the Middle East and U.S. role in its promotion embracing the idea of a new crusade: to bring democracy to the Arab world. For the neo-conservatives, the necessity to act militarily against Iraq wasn’t only justifiable through the usual accusations. No, for Bush ideologists, the overthrow of Iraq’s dictator was the fulcrum of a wider and ambitious plan implying an alteration of the region’s political environment, viewed by the neo-conservatives as a nursery of anti-American feelings, terrorism and dictatorial regimes. Washington promoted the idea that Saddam Hussein removal would allow a faster democratization in Iraq, the first step to unleash a democratic tsunami that would sweep the Arab world. There were even those who stated that a campaign of “spreading democracy” in the Middle East could produce one democratic boom comparable, in magnitude and meaning, to the democratic wave that swept the communist Europe after Berlin’s Wall fall[19].
The debate on the military campaign in Iraq would focus its attentions in the question – apparently lateral – of democracy in the Arab world. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 contributed for the emergency of this topic by breaking an old Washington assumption: that pro-Americans autocratic regimes – as Saudi Arabia – were efficient barriers against the Islamic extremism when, after all, it was discovered that these regimes actually fomented this type of ideology. As such, it isn’t peculiar that, in September of 2002, during the presentation of the National Security Strategy, President Bush declared that democracy is suitable and true for all in any society, and that his Secretary of State, Colin Powell, affirmed the rejection of condescending notions such as the non-development of democracy in the Middle East or the idea of a region that cannot support democracy. In November of 2003, President Bush stated that “sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe — because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty“[20]. President Bush equally expressed that “… governments in the Middle East need to confront real problems, and serve the true interests of their nations. The good and capable people of the Middle East all deserve responsible leadership. For too long, many people in that region have been victims and subjects — they deserve to be active citizens”[21].
But Democracy and Freedom can’t be forced. Both must be conquered. We can only, at the limit, encourage them. To impose freedom is to subvert it, as well as to enforce democracy is to undermine it. And the U.S. rhetoric implies that democracy is susceptible of application in a standard format (the occidental model), that it can be functional in any context and that only with it can the problems of the global world be attenuated. The North Americans love to emphasize the idea of the “democratic peace“, arguing that a world of democracies is more pacific and less inclined to wars. However, such ideas are fallacious, if not even dangerous. As Eric Hobsbawm points out in his article “Delusions about democracy”, the 20th century is proof of States powerlessness to reform the world, to shorten complex historic processes and to implement cross borders transfer institutions. Democracy requires the existence of a set of conditions, i.e., a legitimate State enjoying from the acquiescence of its citizens with the ability/authority the mediate internal conflicts between competing groups, being that the absence of these circumstances can lead to the failure of the State itself. The cases of former republic of Czechoslovakia and Northern Ireland serve as example and Iraq, liberated from Saddam’s unifying (op)pression, seems to be following the same path. Hobsbawm also alerts to the danger of a well intentioned military crusade as “… great power action may have morally or politically desirable consequences, identifying with it is perilous because the logic and methods of state action are not those of universal rights. All established states put their own interests first”.[22]
Thus, it isn’t strange that, for the Islamic world, the imposition of the values of democracy is seen as the western civilization ultimate crusade. Furthermore, it is important to understand that, in the mind of the Arab masses, any discussion about democracy and democratization according to the occidental model is instantly considered as disloyal to the Arab religion and culture. Besides, the Arabs usually denounce western hypocrisy regarding democracy in Middle East as it is only when convenient to the West that measures and actions are taken. To support this claim, they cite in its favor the American and British interventions in the zone throughout the last decades which have hindered the consolidation of Arab democratic regimes, as e.g., the support given by the US to a military coup d’état in Syria after the Syrian parliament refusal to approve the concession of a pipe-line construction by the Arab-American Oil Company (ARAMCO); CIA agents and its British colleagues collaborated, in 1953, in the overthrow of the Iranian Prime-Minister, Mohammed Musaddeq, (a nationalist leader who opposed the destabilizing maneuvers of the URRS in Iran as well as the Great-Britain hegemonic policies in the region) which opened the way to the autocratic government of Shah Reza Pahlavi; in 1956, only due to the presence of the US 6th fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, was King Hussein of Jordan able to affirm his authority and dismiss the elected Prime-Minister, the nasserist Sulayman Nabulsi. These interventions had had a chain reaction effect that is still felt today, weakening democracy credibility. They are lively episodes in the Arabs people’s memory commonly used to demonstrate how occidental democratic speeches are selective according to certain interests – the communist influence of the Iranian’s Tudeh party served as an excuse to another American intervention[23]. Moreover, they also know that imposed freedom isn’t the same as obtained freedom and they fear that this path only leads to the replacement of one kind of subjection by another, under democratic form.
Although the democratization language, the truth is that Washington has serious doubts concerning the way this process will be able to guarantee its regional political and economic benefits, as it doesn’t know what would happen to countries vital to U.S. interest – Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – if democratic elections were held prematurely. The Islamic movements, the so called “Political Islam“, places the United Stated before a dilemma: trust the democratic process, hoping that it smooth the fundamentalists behavior and objectives; or to consider democracy in the Middle East as a sumptuousness commodity that friendly regimes wouldn’t use as it would allow the possibility of anti-democratic forces to gain power. It is precisely with these concerns that the former Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger questioned if it was really our desire the recommend democracy as a form of government to other societies, namely to the Islamic world and particularly to Saudi Arabia[24]. And so did Jeane Kirkpatrick when, reflecting on the subject, said: “The Arab world is the only part of the world where I’ve been shaken in my conviction that if you let the people decide, they will make fundamentally rational decisions. But there, they don’t make rational decisions, they make fundamentalist ones”[25]
To the North American policy makers, democracy in the Arab world is the equivalent to potential problems. In the case of pro-occidental moderate regimes, as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the US government shares those countries leaders’ views that the Islamic extremists constitute their most serious threat. An electoral victory by a fundamentalist faction in one of these pro-western regimes would be a rough blow to occidental interests and the first round of a process that could lead to the implantation of Islamic regimes throughout the entire Arab world, reaching as far as the Maghreb region. Free elections could allow the rise to power of radical and extremists factions, what, in turn, also represents a risk as they can be less cooperatives with its «liberators»[26]. The results of two recent elections in the Middle East are examples to these statements. In Iraq, the Iraq United Alliance, a Shiite Islamic coalition – with predominance of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and that includes Moqtada al-Sadr party, two extremist and anti-American groups – came into power, and the same happened in Palestine, with the electoral victory of the anti-Israeli and anti-American extremist group Hamas. Washington made clear that it will oppose anti-democratic Islamist groups and those who defend democracy in an opportunistic manner, i.e., as a mean to ascend to power. This last perspective, due to the subtleness it implies, can’t be precisely addressed by the American policy. In the opinion of many specialists, the distinction between radical Islamists and moderate ones doesn’t make sense. Instead, the doubt is knowing if both share the same objective – to reach power aiming the creation of a theocratic regimen under Sharia law – with the difference that the latter won’t use violent means. In other words, moderate and extremists would share the same strategical aims but differ on the tactic ones. As we listen to many Islamists speeches, we find that there are serious reasons to suspect the nature of their commitment to the democratic principles. As a result, free elections can effectively provide a fundamentalist government. In this case, after the implantation of democracy and the installation of an elected government, will the U.S. allow that government to follow the policies that they consider best suited without any type of interference? And what if those policies are contrary to the North American interests? Even if these are their intentions, the problem for the United States is that almost nobody in the Arab world believes them.
The same attitude isn’t revealed in relation to the Europeans – except for the British – because the Europeans only pretend to be an example and not to impose their example. The Europeans will support all countries who want to follow the values of democracy, but they have the patience to wait for the people of such countries to arrive, by themselves, to the conclusion that the democratic system is the best there is. This is a huge difference between the way the Europeans and the North Americans are viewed. The Europeans only want to be an example while the U.S. wants its example to be followed and implanted. It is precisely how they are seen. And contrary to what they think, the United States isn’t hated by its success but for wanting to impose its success. As to the influence of the American Revolution in the French Revolution, there isn’t any doubt that it was a strong influence and that the transition for the democratic regimes blossomed in Europe. But the reason for this is that both continents share the values of the Greco-roman and Christian civilization. And, in both cases, the transition processes for democracy happened only after the respective people, or at least one part of them, arrived at the conclusion that democracy was the best way by themselves. To force the values of the Western civilization to the Islamic world isn’t the solution or the path to follow. We must wait that the people of the Arab countries wish to opt for the democratic way and then support their efforts[27].
There are also no doubts that “the new Europe’s Kantian order only could blossom thanks to the protection given by the American power, which were guided by the rules of the old Hobbesian order”[28] and the Europeans know that, it was under the American military power that Europe prospered and they are grateful to the U.S. for their protection and friendship, as they are also grateful to the Germans for believing and supporting the EU[29]. But, it isn’t less true that by protecting Europe, the Unite States were protecting themselves because, once the risk of a nuclear attack was calculated[30], in the case of a new war only conventional armaments would be used and such conflict would occur in Europe, safeguarding the North American soil. Europe was the first line of the U.S. defense, and allowing the European States an economically comeback also served the United States objectives, as, by creating strong allies in Europe and Asia the U.S. were increasing the fronts of reaction and containment of the Soviet threat. Nowadays, most North Americans think that the Europeans have forgotten its aid, but they’re wrong.
Furthermore, the Europeans never intended to be America’s counterbalance and only rival economically with it. This is an argument created with the intention to support the positions defended by realists and republicans on the current route of U.S. foreign policy. Unfortunately, by being used, it makes Europeans to be seen, by the American people, as its adversaries, which isn’t true, because Europeans aren’t the North Americans enemies. Why are these arguments used by some North American politicians? Because arguments as these represent votes in the U.S. internal electoral campaigns, either for the Senate, for the Chamber of the Representatives and for the Presidency. Personally, it doesn’t surprise me that each time that an internal election occurs, either in the U.S., in France, in Portugal or in any other country of the world, the international subjects are relegated for second place because what gives more votes to the politicians are the national subjects. Such fact is also due to the resistance to change by the political power, because the current civilization transition we are living[31] questions its «status quo». My worry is the consequences the misuse of this type of arguments can make. In truth, despite the shock caused by 9/11 and the consequent vulnerability of the American soil, the North American politicians are aware of the risk that the dissolution of the Transatlantic Alliance represents for the world stability because they know that the «West» isn’t NATO only. It is, but the «West» is also the common values of civilization that we both share and – although divergences of perspectives that must be resolved within the Transatlantic Alliance – these values make the bonds of the friendship and the alliance between Europeans and North Americans, ensuring the dominance of our civilization.
It is perfectly normal that the “U.S. wants to return to a stingier nationalism”[32] now that the Cold War is over, as well as it is perfectly legitimate “the ambition to play a huge role in the world stage”[33], but these ambitions must be questioned when they subvert the principles and the ideals that have given origin to them. The measures created for the war against terrorism are an example, where it is suitable to remind that the first casualty suffered by the «West», was the reduction of civil rights and liberties of its citizens. The Western democracies governments decided that freedom should be sacrificed in favor of security. I don’t argue with this. I limit myself to remember Benjamin Franklin words: “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety”. And the problem is that these laws were made in the hysteria of the moment and, thus, the limits of the reasonable were exceeded. The best example of this statement comes from the U.S., through the “Patriot Act”, whose approval without being read, by the legislative power, besides restricting the rights and freedom of the North American citizens also puts in cause the system of checks and balances of which the U.S. are so proud. How can the legislative power say it “checks” the executive branch, if it approves laws without knowing their contents? These are examples, but there are others that can also have catastrophic results for the international security. Forgetting some errors committed in the past – as the financial and militarily support given to Osama Bin Laden and the Saddam Hussein – the U.S. Department of Defense asked Congress funds to form pro-American militias around the world. Won’t this be another measure that will turn itself against America?
Robert Kagan says that “the European integration proved to be an enemy of the European military power and… of an important role of the Europe in the world”[34] since that, either in Middle-East or in any other part of the world, it is to the U.S., not Europe, that the parts in dispute turn to look for support for a resolution of its conflicts. This is unquestionable. But, let’s consider the alternative. Can the United States afford the luxury of non-participation in these attempts? Won’t this imperil the reason of being of the anarchical Hobbesian world? And is it only through military power that Europe has an important role in the world? No. And isn’t rigorous to state that Europeans don’t worry with external questions. The Europeans are worried about what goes on in the world, they simply don’t do it as the U.S. would like. Here we also find a difference between Europeans and North Americans, therefore while the Europeans look at the world as it is, the North Americans do it in accordance to their strategic objectives. In turn, the U.S. don’t accept that the Europeans don’t want to see the world in the military power perspective and persist in the use of this type of perspective because it is precisely for it that the assumption of a long age of American hegemony is reasonable. Yet, the civilization transition we live in will force the political-military power to be subordinated to the economic power. Even under the economic perspective, the U.S. still continues to be a superpower and the hegemony is still American, but this hegemony will be determined by the economic sphere. What will be the reaction of the political and military spheres to hinder the weakness of its decision capacities?
A Geopolitical or geoeconomic World?
How should we analyze today’s world? Should we divide it geopolitically or geoeconomically? The current political organization, particularly the western civilization, is determined by the State born of the industrial revolution. However, the State, as we know it, is dead and buried. Already it doesn’t provide for the ends it was created for, due to two situations that characterize occidental democracies: First, as soon as a candidate is elected, his first priority is its own well-being; second, the lobbies that, in the defense of its own interests, provoke deviations in the conduction of governmental social policies causing these to lose the perspective of the well-being of all society. Consequently, the power of the State was depauperated with the appearance of social agents who, on one hand, help when assuming responsibilities, but, on the other hand, weaken it, by “robbing” its authority.
With the technological revolution that we are experiencing, which has the double effect of provoking the collapse of the industries and the way of life at the same time that completely substitutes them by new others[35], the world is changing and the current structure of the State only prevails due to the resistance of the political power. It is curious that, considering the social, economical and political spheres of the State, it is precisely the last one that resists more and ignores this change, continuing to act as if the world is still the same[36]. Resistance to change is a human instinct, but worst than to resist is to deny it and not be prepared for it because change is inevitable[37]. As such, political power can’t continue to have this type of posture at the risk of inadequacy to the technological and civilization evolution, which will have negative effects in whole of the society, and also because the current national strategic objectives won’t be the same for much more time, as “in the twenty-first century, brainpower and imagination, invention, and the organization of new technologies are the key strategic ingredients”[38]. Computer science, quantum physics and bio-molecular technology will make natural resources – particularly oil, which already is a scarce good and it is the only capital for some States – lose their importance and as such, they will incite wealth redistribution at a global scale. Thus, the world will be economically, and not politically, divided. The economic power will supersede and dominate the politic power – if it already doesn’t – and the commerce scale will substitute the balance of the power, without eliminating it.
Under the economic perspective, as commerce is a factor of human approach and as this is associated with the geographic knowledge of the world, it is fit to analyze the evolution of the commerce center. The center of the worldwide commerce was dislocated as geographic horizons were expanded. Starting from a limited geographic space, commerce is, nowadays, global and, at present, it is noted a new displacement in its center of gravity. Thus, to a period when the center of commerce remained in Europe and in Mediterranean, with the Discoveries, there was dislocation to the Atlantic and, presently, it seems to be moving towards the Pacific. But, let us start from the beginning.
Before the Discoveries, the center of the commerce was in the Mediterranean, where, due to its geographic localization, the commercial exchanges were dominated by the Italian Republics. Once that, “geopolitically, the European «continent» was, in a coarse form, limited by water and ice at the north and west, frequently opened to invasions by land from the east and vulnerable to strategic hoaxes from the south”[39], when it turned itself toward the Atlantic, became “a continent «without margins»”[40] and “took world attentions, surprising the universe, and destroyed the Interior sea privileges”[41]. With this, it initiated the displacement of the commerce center of the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and to the predominance of England. With the losses of the North American colonies, England lost one of its motives of pride, as it no longer could affirm to own colonies all over the world[42] and with the U.S. independence we can say “(…) that from 1783 existed an important extra-European center of production, wealth and – finally – military power able to exert long run influences on the global balance of power (…)”[43] what was confirmed as, after more than century of dominance, New York replaces London as capital of the worldwide commerce. Accordingly, “the loss of England’s importance was also Europe’s subalternization”[44], but this didn’t mean that the center of the worldwide commerce was dislocated from the Atlantic. No, it only moved from Europe to North America, more precisely to the United States east coast. Presently, there are those who say that U.S., due to lack of alternatives, will substitute themselves[45] and there are those who refer a displacement of the center of gravity of the world-wide commerce from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
Besides the dynamism that has characterized this zone of the globe, it is there where are located the most desirable markets of the world – China and India – and the largest economic space of the world, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a regional block characterized by the absence of preferential commerce agreements between its members. Aware of this situation and to the superiority that China starts to have in the Asian zone, already threatening U.S. leadership[46], these – also APEC members – try to avoid such scenarios. Thus, in case of an effective predominance of the Pacific and the consequent displacement of the center of the worldwide commerce, perhaps this center, when moving to this zone, could be installed in the U.S. west coast, wherefrom the United States wouldn’t be much affected. As there isn’t any market in the world able to keep up with the Chinese market, either in growth or in the external direct investment attraction, it is very difficult to hinder the dislocation of the worldwide commerce center and today, for the first time in human history, we have two world centers: the political one in the Atlantic and the economic one placed in the Pacific.
Consequently, the – more than probable – next world division is going to be economical instead of political. The transition of the predominance of the politic power (characteristic of the organic structures born with the industrial revolution) over to the economic power (characteristic of the organic structures formed by the technological revolution) won’t be easy and could be tumultuous, consonant to the political power reaction to change. The world already is divided in some economic regions and it is only a question of time for all these regions to cluster themselves forming the global market. Thus, on one hand, due to the increasing complexity of the nets of commercial relations that characterize the current world which has deepened the global interdependence and to the profound transformations that the technological revolution will provoke in the current concepts of wealth and of “national” strategic objectives and, on the other hand, due to factors of cultural identity, religious and geographic proximity, this gathering process will cause the global market to be influenced by four geoeconomic zones, being that three of them will be strong economic areas while the fourth zone, in which almost the totality of the Islam geography is located, will be a kind of buffer zone subject to the influence of the others.
Although the interdependence characterizes global market and consequently the geoeconomic zones, it is natural that inside each one there is a stronger influence. Thus, it is foreseen[47] that one of these zones will be influenced by the U.S., another by the Europe/Russia, another one by China and finally, the buffer zone, which will be influenced by religion. Reminding that technology is going to revolutionize the energy sources, diminishing fossil fuels importance – that already are scarce – and leading to the loss of influence of the Arab States and increasing the possibility of religious conflicts, it will be up to the Transatlantic Alliance, whether by Europe or U.S. action, to counterbalance Chinese commercial might and to appease the religious tensions.
However, the idea of Europe becoming “the next superpower, not only economic and politically, but as well as military”[48] isn’t out of the question. We must consider EU next enlargements because its growth isn’t finished. Presently, the candidate States to EU membership are Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey. But in the future, candidacies of Ukraine, Belarus and even Russia can’t be excluded. And why should we reflect on this possibility? Common reasons to all are economic, commercial and demographic. Regarding Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, beyond the above mentioned reasons, international isolation is also an issue. Particularly to Russia[49], that must consider its options between EU and China. In turn, Turkey’s adhesion will have an enormous psychological effect within the Arab world because by receiving an Islamic country in their core and opposing the feeling that occidentals view themselves as superior and that they’ll never embrace strangers within their family, EU will be viewed with other eyes by the Arab world. At a first glimpse, unintentionally, and without looking to do so, the path proposed by Ash, Cooper and Robertson[50] can still happen because when – and if – all these countries join the EU, Europe will see, unwillingly, its military power increase considerably.
That would be precisely one of things that the Transatlantic Alliance needs. As the world economic center shifts to the Pacific, two strong economic, political and military pillars are what NATO must accomplish in order to maintain its world dominance. The other priority is – remembering Thomas Jefferson’s words “I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times” – the evolution of the Transatlantic Alliance into a world organization. For that matter, the 10th article of the Washington Treaty should be reviewed, and countries as, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Mexico, South Korea, Brazil and India ought to, at the very least, be heard about their availability to join the Transatlantic Alliance. Today’s threats aren’t confined to the north Atlantic region and there’re other zones of the globe that share westerns principles and values. These Ideals gave birth to NATO, why can’t the same beliefs be the reason to form the «World Security Organization»? And why not the 2009 day of April’s 4th to witness such a memorable achievement? [51]
Map 1 – The Transatlantic Alliance in geoeconomic world
Conclusions
Richard Rosecrance was right when he said that the international system is characterized by two worlds, the political-military and the commercial world. A dualistic vision is the one that better interprets the international relations. The predicament is that, at the same time, the same situation is viewed through the military power by the North Americans and through the economic power by the Europeans.
Under the military power perspective, if we consider the adherence of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia to EU – either as members states or in a kind of strategic partnership – the possibility of Europe becoming a military superpower is not put aside. Regardless, this depends on the U.S. interpretation and reaction to this scenario. If the U.S. accepts the reasons that will lead to this adhesion or partnership are strictly economic, the Transatlantic Alliance will be a true step forward to the worldwide peace assurance. If, in reverse, the U.S. looks on this in a negative way, then the Transatlantic Alliance will undergo an agitated period, with serious consequences to the Western world and to worldwide stability. In turn, in a world commercially viewed, the Transatlantic Alliance will have an enormous importance therefore it will serve to soothe and to contain disputes between the Western and the Islamic worlds, and it will also have a colossal role in the relations with the oriental world, particularly with the Chinese. Naturally that between the transatlantic allies there will be convulsions and frictions, but once the agreement is reached worldwide progress will be a reality.
But is really this the best way to achieve such status?
Notwithstanding the usefulness of a dualist vision, at the same time as the technological revolution changes the globe it also changes our world’s views. And because in the future of the Transatlantic Alliance lays the fate of the Western civilization, it’s my opinion that Europe must realize the prerequisites of a geoeconomic world, i.e., become a military, political and economic world power by itself. If the latter isn’t a concern, both EU and its member states must increase their defense budgets and modernize its armed forces in order to acquire the former two. In a globe with two world centers – a political in the Atlantic and an economic in the Pacific – this isn’t an option. It’s mandatory. As in such a world, the Alliance only can subsist and evolve with two strong columns. Only after these conditions are gathered can the entrance of Ukraine and Belarus to EU be consider. Russia’s case is a completely different matter as it poses several concerns and questions.
In any case, whenever the European Idealism and the North American Realism find the equilibrium between them, this will make the Transatlantic Alliance one forum of concord and progress for the entire world. This is the responsibility of the Europeans and the North Americans. To led mankind into the future and into space exploration. I hope that they will wish to continue to do so together. Hence, despite the different perspectives between Europeans and North Americans, they’re still the «West». And, yes, it is still the Transatlantic Alliance, because without it the world will be much more unstable.
And although irrefutably Europeans and North Americans complete themselves, this type of understanding solely within the region of the North Atlantic is no longer sufficient. If the Transatlantic Alliance doesn’t keep pace with the times it won’t adapt itself to the world we live in and the Western civilization will fall. This is not a question of Europe’s or the United States collapse. No. This is the possibility of the downfall of a way of live, its principles and values. So, it’s time to embrace the representatives the western civilization located around the world in our midst. NATO must become a world organization.
To finalize, can we, Europeans, criticize the U.S. for its behavior? No, we cannot. But we can remind the U.S. that, instead of behaving as a true leader, they behave exactly as those who made the Mayflower pilgrims run away to create a new world. My distrust, as a European who admires the North American spirit, is that today, more than ever, the words of John Quincy Adams might become true and the U.S. may no longer be masters of their own spirit and are going around the world in search of monsters to destroy.
The world needs that the United States refocuses on its path and reconfirms its leadership. At least, I do.
[1] See KAGAN, Robert, “Of Paradise of Power – America and Europe in the new world order” – Portuguese ed. Lisboa: Multitipo Artes Gráficas, 20032003, 12 (my translation)
[2] See CLAUSEWITZ, Karl Von, “Von Kriege” 2nd Portuguese ed. Martins: Publicações Europa-América, 1997, 46 (my translation)
[3] See KAGAN, 2003, 46 (my translation)
[4] Ditto, 18 (my translation)
[5] With the American Civil War, the American Revolution finally ended.
[6] North American Naval Strategist (1840-1914). His book, The Influence of Sea Power upon history, 1660-1783 became the single most influential book on strategy and foreign policy in his time.
[7] See KENNEDY, Paul, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” – 2nd Portuguese Ed. Mem Martins: Publicações Europa-América, 1997, 16 (my translation)
[8] See http://www.thisnation.com/library/jqadams1821.html
[9] See KAGAN, 2003, 18
[10] Austria’s Succession war
[11] CARPENTIER, Jean; LEBRUN François, “Histoire de l’Europe” 2nd Portuguese ed. Lisboa: Editorial Estampa 1996, 292 (my translation)
[12] East-Timor, the first nation of the 21st century
[13] See KAGAN, 2003, 25-26 (my translation)
[14] Ditto, 70 (my translation)
[15] GRIFFITHS, Martin, “Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations”, London: Routledge,1999, 5
[16] See KAGAN, 2003, 35 (my translation)
[17] See GRIFFITHS, 1999,23
[18] See SCHLESINGER, James “The Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy” in Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, nº 1, 20, 1993
[19] See OTTAWAY, Marina et al. – “Democratic Mirage in the Middle East” in Policy Brief, nº 20, October 2002, 1
[20] See BUSH, George W. – “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East”, Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 06/11/2003
[21] Ditto
[22] See HOBSBAWM, Eric – “Delusions about Democracy”, ( http://www.counterpunch.org/hobsbawm01252005.html)
[23] See PERRY, Glenn E. – “Democracy and Human Rights in the Shadow of the West” in Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 14, nº 4, October 1992
[24] See SCHLESINGER, James, 1993
[25] http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/IslamvsDemocracy.htm
[26] Richard Holbrooke mentioned this dilemma during the former Yugoslavia case. The same concern is valid to the Arab countries. Free elections can lead to the election of a fundamentalist government
[27] This affirmation can be exemplified by what happened in Lebanon. The International Community just supported the Lebanese population initiatives; therefore an invasion was not needed to ascertain the withdrawal of the Syrian presence.
[28] See KAGAN, 2003, 82 (my translation)
[29] The Franco-German commitment in Europe’s reconstruction of the post-Second World War allow the correction of the errors made with the armistice signed at the end of the First World War, that humiliated Germany and lead to a new conflict.
[30] As previous mentioned, the American initiatives to the construction of a shield against a nuclear strike raised the fear of an actual nuclear war as with the capacity to destroy its opponent response the U.S might not resist the idea of launching a focalized nuclear strike. The capacity to destroy a response can be done, but there isn’t any shield that protects the U.S. from the winds and the rains. It remains to be known if such effects are acceptable to the North American strategists.
[31] As there are different degrees of development between the world’s civilizations we must be aware that the transition is intra-civilization and only then inter-civilization, i.e., first the clash is internal and then external. See FERREIRA DA SILVA, Vicente, “Destination: Globalization?”, O Primeiro de Janeiro Journal, July, 5, 2007 (my translation)
[32] See KAGAN, 2003, 91 (my translation)
[33] Ditto, 97 (my translation)
[34] Ditto, 74 (my translation)
[35] See KAKU, Michio, “Visions”. 2nd Portuguese ed. Lisboa: Editorial Bizâncio,1999, 23 (my translation)
[36] See OHMAE, Kenichi, “The End of the Nation State”, London: Harper Collins Publishers,1996, viii
[37] It is necessary to remember Alvin Toffler’s teachings (Future Shock; The Third Wave; Powershift; Creating a New Civilization)
[38] See THUROW, Lester C., “The future of Capitalism: How today’s economic forces shapes tomorrow’s world”. New York: Penguin Books,1996, 279
[39] See KENNEDY, 1997, 29 (my translation)
[40] See BRAUDEL, Fernand, “L’Europe” Portuguese ed. Lisboa: Terramar, 1996, 88 (my translation)
[41] Ditto, 101 (my translation)
[42] See FERRO, Marc, “Histoire des Colonisations. Des Conquêtes aux Indépendances (XIIIe – XXe)”– Portuguese ed. Lisboa: Estampa, 1996, 94 (my translation)
[43] See KENNEDY, 1997, 125 (my translation)
[44] See BRAUDEL, 1996, 111 (my translation)
[45] Ditto, 113
[46] See PERLEZ, Jane – «China Races to Replace U.S. as Economic Power in Asia» in New York Times (www.nytimes.com/2002/06/28/international/asia/28asia.html)
[47] There aren’t political borders at the global world. The zones considered in the map are delimitated by cultural and religious elements. Each zone is composed by several economic regions that internally are interdependent between themselves and externally with the others geoeconomic zones.
[48] See KAGAN, 2003, 31 (my translation)
[49] Despite considering the possibility of a Russian candidacy to the EU, we also must think about what it means. The recent Putin’s positions, in relation to the anti-missile shield and the energy resources, reveal a change of heart that we must be aware of. Russia collaboration in the NATO-Russian Council has cooled down and, supported in capitalist structures, Russia is resurging in the worldwide scene. It has been able to recover its past influence among some of the former soviet republics (due to its role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). Logically, strategically it has more to gain by turning to Europe, where it may find bigger world preeminence. With new wealth its expansion tendencies have returned, which means that the legacy of Peter the Great isn’t forgotten. So, the question is: who has more to gain with NATO’s disbanding?
[50] See KAGAN, 77, 66 e 78
[51] See FERREIRA DA SILVA, “The Transatlantic Alliance in the Pacific Century” – Portuguese Ed., Portuguese National Defense Institute, Sept., 2007, 42-45
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